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WINDSHIELD LEAFLETING ORDINANCES: A
PERMISSIBLE USE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
AUTHORITY?
Tony Bickel*

I. INTRODUCTION
As “historic weapons in the defense of liberty,” 1 leaflets have played
a critical role in the United States. In 1776, Thomas Paine’s pamphlet
Common Sense argued for independence and sparked the American
Revolution. 2 The federal government also promoted the use of leaflets
to advertise for war bond selling campaigns during World War II. 3 The
importance of leafleting lingered into the twentieth century, and in 1938,
the Supreme Court recognized that the First Amendment protected
leafleting. 4 However, the right to leaflet is not absolute. 5
The Supreme Court has addressed whether local governments may
regulate the distribution of leaflets in several contexts, but has yet to
address ordinances that prohibit windshield leafleting. The issue pits a
speaker’s First Amendment right to free speech against both a city’s
esthetic interest in preventing litter and citizens’ private property
interests in their vehicles. 6 The United States Circuit Courts of Appeals
* Associate Member, 2009–2010 University of Cincinnati Law Review.
1. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938).
2. RICHARD B. BERNSTEIN, THE FOUNDING FATHERS RECONSIDERED 41 (2009). Thomas
Paine, a founding father of the United States, is most well-known for his pamphlet, Common Sense,
which argued “that independence was desirable, well-deserved, and within reach.” Id. at 41. Many
colonists read Common Sense, and it is considered to have played a pivotal role in igniting the
Revolutionary War. Id.
3. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943) (citations omitted).
4. See Lovell, 303 U.S. at 452 (“The liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and
periodicals. It necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets.”).
5. See Horina v. Granite City, 538 F.3d 624, 631 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he right to handbill is not
absolute.”); Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 809–10 (1984)
(upholding ordinance that prohibited the placement of signs or leaflets on utility poles); Heffron v. Int’l
Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 654–56 (1981) (upholding a restriction on
leafleters to specific booths at a state fair); see also Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 155 (1939)
(“[T]he right of free expression is not absolute but subject to reasonable regulation.”) (citation omitted);
Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (“[T]he peace, good order, and comfort of the
community may imperatively require regulation of the time, place, and manner of [literature]
distribution.”) (citation omitted).
6. See Krantz v. City of Fort Smith, 160 F.3d 1214, 1218–20 (8th Cir. 1998); Jobe v. City of
Catlettsburg, 409 F.3d 261, 262–63 (6th Cir. 2005); Horina, 538 F.3d at 633; Klein v. City of San

749

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2011

1

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 10
BICKEL FINAL FORMAT (Paginated)

750

3/28/2011 7:48:57 AM

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

are split on this issue. The following Comment analyzes this
controversy.
Part II surveys the line of Supreme Court cases at the heart of the
circuit split. Part III then outlines each side of the circuit split. Next,
Part IV argues that local government bans on windshield leafleting are
constitutional time, place, and manner restrictions. Lastly, Part V urges
the undecided circuits to adopt this position.
II. SUPREME COURT BACKGROUND
Windshield leafleting presents a conflict between the First
Amendment right to distribute literature and a city’s interest both in
maintaining a clean, esthetically appealing environment and in
protecting a citizen’s private property. 7 Considering these competing
interests, the Supreme Court has addressed leafleting directly to persons
in the streets, 8 door-to-door leafleting, 9 sending leaflets through the
mail, 10 and posting leaflets on public utility poles. 11 The circuit courts
are split regarding the proper interpretation of this line of cases and its
application to windshield leafleting. 12
The Supreme Court first addressed leafleting in 1939 in Schneider v.
New Jersey, which struck down several city bans on person-to-person
leafleting on public streets. 13 The cities argued that litter prevention
justified the ordinance; the Court disagreed, holding that “the purpose to
keep the streets clean and of good appearance is insufficient to justify an
ordinance which prohibits a person rightfully on a public street from
handing literature to one willing to receive it.” 14 The Court further
found that through general anti-litter laws, cities have other avenues of
preventing litter, such as punishing “those who actually throw papers on
the streets.” 15
Four years later, in Martin v. City of Struthers, the Court struck down
Clemente, 584 F.3d 1196, 1200 (9th Cir. 2009).
7. See discussion infra Part II.
8. See Schneider, 308 U.S. at 155 (involving a city’s right to prevent littering caused by
leafleting directly to persons in the street).
9. See Martin, 319 U.S. at 144 (involving the property rights of a homeowner and door-to-door
leafleting).
10. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 60 (1983) (regarding the property
rights of a homeowner and the reception of mail).
11. See Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 792–94 (1984)
(regarding a city’s right to prevent visual blight from the posting of signs on utility poles).
12. See discussion infra Part III.
13. Schneider, 308 U.S. at 162–63.
14. Id. at 162 (emphasis added).
15. Id.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol79/iss2/10

2

Bickel: WINDSHIELD LEAFLETING ORDINANCES: A PERMISSIBLE USE OF LOCAL GOVE
BICKEL FINAL FORMAT (Paginated)

2010]

3/28/2011 7:48:57 AM

WINDSHIELD LEAFLETING ORDINANCES

751

a city ban on door-to-door leafleting. 16 While recognizing an interest in
protecting homeowners and indicating that “[c]onstant callers . . . may
lessen the peaceful enjoyment of a home,” 17 the Court noted that doorto-door leafleting “is one of the most accepted techniques of seeking
popular support” and “is essential to the poorly financed causes of little
people.” 18 The Court held that the burden is on the homeowner to first
warn the speaker to stay off their property. 19 The Court noted that after
a homeowner warns a speaker to stay off their property, traditional
trespass statutes effectively serve the government’s interest in protecting
the homeowner from annoyance and crime. 20
In 1983, the Court returned to the competing interests of a speaker
and homeowner in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp. 21 In Bolger,
the Court struck down an ordinance that prohibited mailing unsolicited
leaflets concerning contraceptives. 22 Unlike Martin and Schneider, the
relevant ordinance in Bolger was content-based and thus not analyzed as
a time, place, and manner restriction; 23 nonetheless, the Court
importantly emphasized the ability of the homeowner to reject the
leaflets. 24 As in Martin, the Court put the burden on the homeowner to
reject the leaflets, holding that the homeowner may opt out of further
mailings. 25 The Court reasoned that homeowners are not a “‘captive’
audience” 26 and “may ‘effectively avoid further bombardment of their
sensibilities simply by averting their eyes.’” 27 The Court further found
that the homeowner can simply throw the leaflets away because “‘the
short, though regular, journey from mail box to trash can . . . is an
acceptable burden, at least so far as the Constitution is concerned.’” 28
Although the aforementioned Supreme Court decisions all struck
16. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 149 (1943).
17. See id. at 144 (“Ordinances of the sort now before us may be aimed at the protection of the
householders from annoyance, including intrusion upon the hours of rest, and at the prevention of
crime.”).
18. Id. at 146.
19. Id. at 147–48 (“We know of no state which . . . makes a person a criminal trespasser if he
enters the property of another for an innocent purpose without an explicit command from the owners to
stay away.”).
20. Id. at 148.
21. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
22. Id. at 61.
23. Id. at 68 (analyzing the issue as commercial speech) (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 477 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).
24. Id. at 72.
25. Id. (citing Rowan v. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970)).
26. Id. (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 542 (1980)).
27. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 72 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)) (citation
omitted).
28. Id. (citation omitted).
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down the respective ordinances, in 1984, the Court upheld an ordinance
that prohibited the placing of signs on utility poles in Members of City
Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent. 29 In Taxpayers for Vincent, the city
argued that the prevention of litter and visual blight justified the
ordinance. 30 The Court agreed and held that cities “have a weighty,
essentially esthetic interest in proscribing intrusive and unpleasant
formats for expression,” 31 and “the visual assault on the citizens . . . by
an accumulation of signs . . . constitutes a significant substantive evil
within the City’s power to prohibit.” 32 The Court further held that the
ordinance was narrowly tailored, distinguishing Schneider and rejecting
the notion that the city must resort to general anti-littering laws. 33 The
Court reasoned that Schneider involved the right to “communicate
directly with a willing listener,” while speakers, who post signs on
utility poles, communicate indirectly because they are not present when
the speech is communicated to the listener. 34 The Court further noted
that an anti-littering law would only serve to punish leaflets that fall to
the ground, but would not remedy the visual blight created by the actual
posting of signs. 35
The aforementioned cases show that the Supreme Court has indeed
stressed the broad scope of the First Amendment and provided the
speaker with vast protection to distribute literature. The Court struck
down ordinances that banned leafleting directly to persons in the street,
leafleting homes, and leafleting through the mail. However, as
Taxpayers for Vincent demonstrates, speakers do not have unlimited
rights, and local governments may restrict the distribution of literature in
appropriate contexts.
III. CIRCUIT SPLIT
A circuit split has developed over the interpretation and applicability
of the aforementioned Supreme Court precedent to windshield
leafleting. The Sixth Circuit, in Jobe v. City of Catlettsburg, 36 upheld a
ban on windshield leafleting, 37 citing Taxpayers for Vincent, rather than

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 817 (1984).
See id. at 805–07.
Id. at 806.
Id. at 807.
Id. at 809–10.
Id. at 810.
See Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 810.
409 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 262.
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Schneider, as the controlling case. 38 In contrast, the Seventh, Eighth,
and Ninth Circuits applied Schneider to strike down such bans as
unconstitutional. 39 Both sides of the split considered Bolger, but applied
it differently. 40
This Part further surveys the circuit split. Subsection A discusses the
Sixth Circuit’s decision in Jobe while subsection B discusses the three
circuit decisions that struck down windshield leafleting bans, focusing
on the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Horina v. Granite City. 41
A. Ban on Windshield Leafleting Upheld
The Sixth Circuit stands alone in holding that bans on windshield
leafleting are constitutional. In 2005, the Sixth Circuit upheld a city ban
on windshield leafleting in Jobe v. City of Catlettsburg. 42 The ordinance
stated:
It shall be unlawful for any person to place or deposit or in any manner to
affix or cause to be placed or deposited or affixed to any automobile or
other vehicle or other automotive vehicle, any handbill, sign, poster,
advertisement, or notice of any kind whatsoever, unless he be the owner
thereof, or without first having secured in writing the consent of the
owner thereof. 43

The court analyzed the ordinance as a time, place, and manner
restriction. 44 Time, place, and manner restrictions must (1) be contentneutral, (2) serve a significant government interest, (3) be narrowly
tailored to serve a significant government interest, and (4) leave open
ample alternative channels of communication. 45 Because the ordinance
did not consider the content of the speech, the court focused on the last
three requirements. 46
Regarding the second element, the government argued that the
38. See id. at 268–71.
39. See Krantz v. City of Fort Smith, 160 F.3d 1214, 1222 (8th Cir. 1998); Horina v. Granite
City, 538 F.3d 624, 638 (7th Cir. 2008); Klein v. City of San Clemente, 584 F.3d 1196, 1208 (9th Cir.
2009).
40. See, e.g., Krantz, 160 F.3d at 1221; Jobe, 409 F.3d at 271.
41. 538 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 2008).
42. Jobe, 409 F.3d at 262.
43. Id. at 263.
44. Id. at 267 (holding that the issue did not fall under the public forum doctrine because vehicles
parked on the streets are not a setting that “deal[s] with a method of communication for which one can
say there has been a ‘traditional right of access’ and in neither instance does it offer an apt analogy to the
forms of communication that have long taken our place on our ‘public streets and parks’” (quoting U.S.
Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981))).
45. Id. at 267 (citations omitted).
46. See id. at 268.
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ordinance furthered two significant interests: litter prevention and the
protection of private property. 47 The Sixth Circuit agreed that common
sense supported both interests, in part because thirty-eight other cities
had similar laws. 48 Thus, the court did not require the city to proffer its
own independent evidence, but rather allowed it to rely on other cities’
past evidence and judgment. 49 The court also noted that windshield
leafleting “shares as many qualities with littering as placing the fliers on
the front lawn of a residence, on the top of a boat or . . . any piece of
private property that is not otherwise designed by intent or usage to
receive and hold literature distributed by others.” 50
Discussing the third element, the court held that the ordinance
burdened no more speech than necessary and compared the issue to that
in Taxpayers for Vincent, which upheld a ban on placing signs on utility
poles. 51 The court reasoned that leaflets on windshields are analogous
to signs on utility poles in that the visual blight “‘is created by the
medium of expression itself.’” 52 The court noted that Schneider,
contrarily, only involved leaflets that fell to the ground, a littering
problem caused by the “‘by-product of the activity.’” 53 Thus, the court
concluded that the ordinance “targeted the precise problems—littering
on private automobiles and unauthorized use of private property—that it
wished to correct.” 54
The plaintiff disagreed and, drawing support from Schneider, argued
that the city could control littering through general anti-littering laws. 55
The court distinguished Schneider because Schneider did not consider
the private property interests of the recipient. 56 Additionally, the court
reasoned that “‘[t]he right recognized in Schneider . . . is to tender the
written material to the passerby who may reject it or accept it.’” 57
Emphasizing that absent vehicle owners have “no choice in receiving the
literature, no choice in accepting the burden of disposing of it, and no

47. Jobe, 409 F.3d at 268.
48. Id. at 269. The ordinances existed in several small cities, as well as large cities such as
Atlanta, Philadelphia, Charlotte, Portland, and San Antonio. Id. at 265. Additionally, New York
instituted a state-wide ban. Id.
49. Id. at 269–70.
50. Id. at 273–74.
51. Id. at 269.
52. Id. (quoting Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 810 (1984)).
53. Jobe, 409 F.3d at 269 (quoting Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 810).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 270 (citing Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939)).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 271 (emphasis added) (quoting Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466
U.S. 789, 809–10 (1984)).
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choice in peeling it off the windshield after a rain shower,” the court
found that the current ordinance did not prohibit the traditional leafleting
right recognized in Schneider. 58
The plaintiff argued that vehicle owners could reject the leaflets by
placing a “No Solicitation” sign on the windshield, comparing the
burden to a “do-not-call” or “do-not-spam list.” 59 The court rejected
this argument because, unlike e-mail or the telephone, a windshield is
not a traditional method of communication, and a “No Solicitation” sign
is an “unorthodox burden” to place on vehicle owners. 60 Furthermore,
the court disagreed that vehicle owners should have the burden of
looking away or discarding the leaflet, as in Bolger. 61 The court
reasoned that:
[A]lthough the ‘short, though regular, journey from mail box to trash
can . . . is an acceptable burden’ to place on mailbox owners, that burden
stems from an individual’s choice to erect a mailbox. In marked contrast,
parking a car on a public street is not an invitation to place literature on
the car . . . or to become a vehicular sandwich board for another citizen’s
message of the day. 62

Regarding the final element, the court held that the ordinance leaves
the speaker with several other channels of communication, 63 such as
door-to-door distribution, securely placing leaflets on porches, mailing,
and person-to-person leafleting—including direct distribution to those
who return to their cars. 64 However, the plaintiff argued that the
aforementioned methods are not nearly as efficient in reaching residents
who come downtown. 65 The court responded that, although the
Supreme Court is sensitive to cheap and efficient methods of
communication, “‘this solicitude has practical boundaries,’” 66 and “[a]t
some point, the very cheapness of a mode of communication may lead to
its abuse.” 67
Therefore, the court upheld the ban as a valid time, place, and manner
restriction. 68 The court held that the ordinance burdened no more
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
(1984)).
67.
68.

Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Jobe, 409 F.3d at 272.
Id.
Id. at 270–71.
Id. (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 72 (1983)).
Id. at 270.
Id.
Jobe, 409 F.3d at 272.
Id. (quoting Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812 n.30
Id. at 273.
Id. at 262.
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speech than necessary to prevent litter and protect private property
interests and that the ordinance left speakers with other suitable methods
to deliver their message. 69
B. Ban on Windshield Leafleting Is Unconstitutional
The Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits each struck down ordinances
prohibiting windshield leafleting. 70 The Eighth Circuit first ruled on the
issue in 1998 when it decided Krantz v. City of Fort Smith, 71 a decision
that preceded the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Jobe. However, the
Seventh and Ninth Circuits did not join the split until 2008 and 2009,
respectively, both after the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Jobe. 72
The Seventh Circuit, in Horina v. Granite City, 73 held that a ban on
windshield leafleting violates the First Amendment. 74 The ordinance
stated, “[n]o person shall deposit or throw any handbill in or upon any
vehicle.” 75 As in Jobe, the court analyzed the ordinance as a time,
place, and manner restriction. 76
The court accepted that litter prevention and the protection of private
property can be significant government interests but required “‘evidence
supporting [the government’s] proffered justification.’” 77 The court
stated that the government does not have to produce “a panoply of
‘empirical studies, testimony, police records, [or] reported injuries,’” 78
but it “must nevertheless proffer something showing that the restriction
actually serves a government interest.” 79
69. Id.
70. See Krantz v. City of Fort Smith, 160 F.3d 1214, 1222 (8th Cir. 1998); Horina v. Granite
City, 538 F.3d 624, 638 (7th Cir. 2008); Klein v. City of San Clemente, 584 F.3d 1196, 1208 (9th Cir.
2009).
71. 160 F.3d 1214 (8th Cr. 1998).
72. See Horina v. Granite City, 538 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 2008); Klein v. City of San Clemente, 584
F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2009).
73. 538 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 2008).
74. Id. at 638.
75. Id. at 628. The court also struck down another ordinance that prohibited placing any handbill
on any unoccupied private property. Id. However, because this ordinance is much broader than the
current issue, the constitutional analysis would be beyond the scope of this Article.
76. Id. (concluding that the public forum analysis does not apply because privately owned
vehicles parked on streets are not nonpublic fora).
77. Id. at 633 (quoting Weinberg v. City of Chicago, 310 F.3d 1029, 1038 (7th Cir. 2002)).
78. Id. at 633.
79. Horina, 538 F.3d at 634 (emphasis in original) (citing Weinberg, 310 F.3d at 1039; Watseka
v. Ill. Pub. Action Council, 796 F.2d 1547, 1556 (7th Cir. 1986)). See Krantz v. City of Fort Smith, 160
F.3d 1214, 1221 (8th Cir. 1998) (“[D]efendants must demonstrate the existence of a ‘reasonable fit’
between their asserted goal and the means that they have selected to accomplish it.” (quoting Cincinnati
v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410, 416 (1993))); Klein v. City of San Clemente, 584 F.3d 1196, 1202
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Relying primarily on the statistic that thirty-eight other cities have
similar laws, the government argued that common sense is sufficient to
prove its interests. 80 The court rejected this argument, reasoning that
other cities’ ordinances do not show that the problem is present in that
city. 81 The court also reasoned that a common sense explanation “can
all-too-easily be used to mark unsupported conjecture.” 82 The court
further noted that, even if the government proffered sufficient evidence,
the ordinance was not narrowly tailored. 83 Analogizing the case to
Schneider, the court found that the government’s interests could be
effectively addressed using traditional anti-littering and trespass laws.84
Lastly, the court held that the ordinance did not leave open ample
alternative methods of communication, rejecting both the use of the mail
and person-to-person distribution as suitable alternatives. 85 The court
emphasized that cheaper forms of expression have been given “‘special
solicitude.’” 86 Furthermore, the court noted that person-to-person
distribution “is extremely time consuming and burdensome, particularly
when the individual intends to convey a message to people who park
their automobiles in a certain area of the city or who live in a certain
neighborhood.” 87 The court next found the use of the mail too
expensive 88 and ineffective at reaching those who park at a particular
location. 89 In summary, the court struck down the ordinance for failing
the second, third, and fourth elements of the time, place, and manner
analysis. 90
The Eighth and Ninth Circuits invalidated similar bans and advanced
the same general reasoning as the Seventh Circuit in Horina. The Ninth
Circuit, in Klein v. Clemente, 91 placed additional emphasis on the rights

(9th Cir. 2009) (Local governments must “show some nexus between leaflets placed on vehicles and a
resulting substantial increase in litter on the streets before we could find that the City’s asserted interest
in preventing littering on the street justifies a prohibition on placing leaflets on windshields.”).
80. Horina, 538 F.3d at 633–34.
81. Id. at 634.
82. Id. at 633 (citations omitted).
83. Id. at 634.
84. Id. at 635 (citations omitted).
85. Id. at 635–36.
86. Horina, 538 F.3d at 635 (quoting Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899, 906 (7th Cir. 2000)
(quoting Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812 n.30 (1984))).
87. Id. at 636.
88. Id. (citing Gresham, 225 F.3d at 906; Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 812 n.30).
89. Id. (citing Weinberg v. City of Chicago, 310 F.3d 1029, 1040 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[A]n
alternative is not adequate if it ‘forecloses a speaker’s ability to reach one audience even if it allows the
speaker to reach other groups.’” (quoting Gresham, 225 F.3d at 907))).
90. Id. at 638.
91. 584 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2009).
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and burdens of the recipient. The court stressed that the ordinance
punished vehicle owners who may want to receive the leaflets,
commenting that “the ‘right to distribute literature . . . necessarily
protects the right to receive it.’” 92 The court placed the burden on the
recipient to throw the leaflet in the trash. 93 Thus, the court took the
opposite interpretation of Bolger than the Sixth Circuit in Jobe, arguing
that “[j]ust as the ‘short though regular, journey from mail box to trash
can . . . is an acceptable burden,’ . . . so the burden on recipients of
disposing of unwanted leaflets cannot justify hampering speech.” 94 The
Ninth Circuit recognized that recipients must have the ability to reject
speech, but found that vehicle owners are not a “captive audience” 95 and
may simply look away or place a “No Solicitation” sign on their
vehicle. 96
IV. DISCUSSION
Similar to the Sixth Circuit, this Part argues that bans on windshield
leafleting are constitutional. As highlighted above, the circuit split is
caused by conflicting interpretations of three key issues within the time,
place, and manner framework: (1) what evidence is required to justify a
government’s significant interests in litter prevention and the protection
of private property; (2) whether, in light of Schneider and other Supreme
Court precedent, bans on windshield leafleting are narrowly tailored;
and (3) whether adequate alternative channels of communication remain
for the speaker. This Part does not discuss whether such bans are
content-neutral because all four circuits unanimously held that bans on
windshield leafleting do not consider the content of the speech. 97
Subsection A argues that common sense is sufficient to justify the
government’s interests in preventing litter and protecting private
property, and that a government may rely on other cities’ evidence.
Subsection B argues that bans on windshield leafleting are narrowly
tailored. Finally, Subsection C argues that direct distribution to
92. Id. at 1204 (quoting Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943)).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1204–05 (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 72 (1983)).
95. Klein, 584 F.3d at 1204 n.6 (quoting Bolger, 463 U.S. at 72).
96. Id. at 1205 (citing Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970)).
97. Id. at 1201 (“The parties agree that the ordinance is content-neutral, so the first prong of the
traditional ‘time, place, and manner’ inquiry is not at issue in this case.”); Jobe v. City of Catlettsburg,
409 F.3d 261, 268 (6th Cir. 2005) (“The law does not draw distinctions based on the topic of speech at
issue or the point of view of the speaker.”); Krantz v. City of Fort Smith, 160 F.3d 1214, 1219 (8th Cir.
1998); Horina v. Granite City, 538 F.3d 624, 639 (7th Cir. 2008) (Manion, J., dissenting) (“It is
undisputed that the Ordinance is content-neutral.”).
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passersby and homes are more than adequate alternatives to windshield
leafleting.
A. Significant Government Interest
All four circuits generally agree that litter prevention and the
protection of private property can serve as significant government
interests. However, they fundamentally disagree as to whether a local
government must proffer evidence that littering is a problem in that
particular city. The Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits require
independent evidence, while the Sixth Circuit held that a common sense
explanation is sufficient.
The Sixth Circuit’s holding is more persuasive. Common sense is a
valid tool to judge the constitutionality of a statute and should received
similar treatment in this context. 98 While appropriate in some instances,
governments should not have to show independent evidence where
common sense supports their proffered interests. In Metromedia, Inc. v.
San Diego, the Supreme Court considered whether a ban on billboards
directly advanced traffic safety and esthetic interests. 99 The Court
deferred to “the accumulated, commonsense judgments of local
lawmakers” 100 and held that “[i]t is not speculative to recognize that
billboards by their very nature . . . can be perceived as an ‘esthetic
harm.’” 101
Common sense and daily experience show that litter prevention and
the protection of private property are significant government interests in
any city. Windshield leafleting, by its “very nature,” 102 impedes the
aforementioned interests. Vehicles are not designed to serve as bulletin
boards, and, whether by wind, rain, or simply gravity, leaflets may easily
fall to the ground. Additionally, “[w]hile the more thoughtful drivers
dispose of such flyers properly, common sense tells us that at least some
of the unwanted flyers become litter, even without evidence from the
City.” 103
A government’s interest in preventing litter embodies a secondary
98. See Anderson v. Milwaukee County, 433 F.3d 975, 978 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Common sense
must not be and should not be suspended when judging the constitutionality of a rule or statute.”).
99. Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
100. Id. at 509 (emphasis added). See also Multimedia Publ’g Co. v. Greenville–Spartanburg
Airport Dist., 991 F.2d 154, 160–61 (4th Cir. 1993) (“To advance [its] interests, the [city] need not have
adduced specific factual evidence that its interests were advance by the ban . . . ; it was entitled to
advanced its interest by arguments based on appeals to common sense and logic.”) (citations omitted).
101. Metromedia, Inc., 452 U.S. at 510 (emphasis added).
102. Id.
103. Horina v. Granite City, 538 F.3d 624, 640 (7th Cir. 2008) (Manion, J., dissenting).
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interest in preventing visual blight. 104 Thus, even if leaflets remain
affixed to vehicles and do not fall to the ground, the resulting visual
blight justifies city action. If signs on utility poles cause sufficient
visual blight to justify a city ban, 105 then the same common sense
justification applies to leaflets on windshields; leaflets on windshields
are as significant an eyesore as signs posted on utility poles.
With regard to private property interests, it is hardly speculative to
conclude that upon returning to their cars, many vehicle owners would
be displeased to find a leaflet pinned under their windshield wipers.
Justice Manion, dissenting in Horina, commented that:
It would be the rare driver indeed who has not experienced the intrusion
of a flyer placed under a car windshield and the annoyance of removing
the flyer, especially in inclement weather or when the driver doesn’t
notice it tucked under the passenger side windshield wiper until after
fastening his seatbelt and starting his car. 106

Evidence of other cities’ windshield leafleting bans further supports a
common sense justification. When the Sixth Circuit decided Jobe,
thirty-eight other cities had laws banning windshield leafleting. 107 In
Horina, the Ninth Circuit rejected the government’s reliance on other
cities’ laws on grounds that a city must prove that the problem exists in
that particular city. However, both the Sixth Circuit and the Supreme
Court agree that a government may rely on another government’s
findings. In Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., the Supreme Court
considered the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance affecting adult
theaters. 108 The Court found that the city “was entitled to rely on the
experiences . . . of other cities” 109 and did not have to produce evidence
“specifically relating to [its] ‘particular problems or needs.’” 110
Furthermore, “[t]he First Amendment does not require a city . . . to
conduct new studies or produce evidence independent of that already
generated by other cities, so long as whatever evidence the city relies
upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the city
addresses.” 111 Similarly, in Metromedia, discussed earlier, the Court
104. See Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410, 417 (1993) (analyzing the government’s
interest in preventing “visual blight caused by littering”); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Beacon Hill
Architectural Comm’n, 847 F. Supp. 178, 193 (D. Mass. 1994) (noting that “to regulate littering” is “to
regulate [a] form[ ] of visual blight”), rev’d on other grounds, 100 F.3d 175 (1st Cir. 1996).
105. See Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 816–17 (1984).
106. Horina v. Granite City, 538 F.3d 624, 640 (7th Cir. 2008) (Manion, J., dissenting).
107. Jobe v. City of Catlettsburg, 409 F.3d 261, 269 (6th Cir. 2005).
108. Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 41 (1986).
109. Id. at 51.
110. Id. at 50 (citation omitted).
111. Id. at 51–52.
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found that San Diego had an esthetic interest in restricting billboards
largely based on evidence that other states and municipalities had similar
laws. 112
In the current context, a common sense approach is essential because
it may be impossible to collect evidence of littering and invasion of
private property.
Complaints are potentially the only type of
independent, direct evidence that a city can proffer, and they are likely
to be small in number, if present at all. Without a common sense
justification, recognizing that litter prevention and the protection of
private property are significant interests would only be realizable in
theory.
In review, Supreme Court precedent clearly shows that common sense
can justify a government’s interests, especially when numerous other
cities have passed similar laws. Because a significant number of cities
have banned windshield leafleting, 113 a local government should not
have to offer independent evidence to justify such a ban. Nevertheless,
this Comment recognizes that, given the adverse holdings of the
Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, local governments should take the
safe route and not assume all courts will share the views of the Sixth
Circuit. As a result, local lawmakers should establish evidence of
littering and private property invasions prior to enacting a windshield
leafleting ordinance.
The evidence required to satisfy the adverse view is unclear. The
Eight Circuit in Krantz found complaints from vehicle owners
insufficient; 114 similarly, the Ninth Circuit in Klein held that “preventing
a marginal quantity of litter” is insufficient, and the city must show that
windshield leafleting “creates an abundance of litter significantly
beyond the amount the City already manages to clean up.” 115 On the
other hand, the Seventh Circuit in Horina noted that a city does not have
to “produce a panoply of ‘empirical studies, testimony, police records,
[or] reported injuries,’” 116 and Justice Manion, in dissent, suggested that
a city could provide “a statement by a police officer, street cleaner, or

112. Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 510 (1981) (“San Diego, like many States and
other municipalities, has chosen to minimize the presence of” billboards. (footnote omitted)).
113. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
114. Krantz v. City of Fort Smith, 1650 F.3d 1214, 1221–22 (8th Cir. 1998) (“[N]otwithstanding
defendants’ evidence that government officials received complaints about handbills left on cars and that
the ordinances were enacted for the purposes of preventing litter, defendants have not established a
factual basis for concluding that a cause-and-effect relationship actually exists between the placement of
handbills on parked cars and litter that impacts the [public welfare] of the defendant cities.”).
115. Klein v. City of San Clemente, 584 F.3d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added).
116. Horina v. Granite City, 538 F.3d 624, 633 (7th Cir. 2008).
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other witness with first-hand knowledge” of the problem. 117 Given the
aforementioned standards, and because the decision in Krantz precedes
the recent trend of windshield leafleting litigation, 118 local lawmakers
would probably be safe presenting evidence from street cleaners,
documented citizen complaints, or police officers.
B. Narrowly Tailored
Two issues have confounded circuit courts under the ‘narrowly
tailored’ analysis. The first issue is whether Schneider requires
governments to use anti-littering and trespass laws rather than ban
windshield leafleting. The second issue is the appropriate burden to
place on the recipient to reject the leaflets. The following subsections
address each issue.
1. Schneider Does Not Require the Use of General Anti-Littering and
Trespass Laws in the Windshield Leafleting Context
As mentioned earlier, in Schneider the Supreme Court struck down an
ordinance that prohibited leafleting on public streets, 119 emphasizing
that a general anti-littering ordinance could adequately serve the
government’s interest in preventing littering. 120 The Seventh Circuit
applied this principle in Horina. 121 In contrast, the Sixth Circuit
persuasively distinguished Schneider from Jobe. 122
Schneider involved person-to-person leafleting, and each recipient
had the present ability to reject the speech. Vehicle owners, absent from
their vehicles, do not have the same opportunity because “the driver is
unknown and the receptacle is mobile and lacks the ability to accept or
reject the handbill.” 123 An argument can be made that vehicle owners
have the ability to reject leaflets using a “No Solicitation” sign, and as a
result, the activity would fall within the Schneider holding. However,

117. Id. at 640 n.5 (Manion, J., dissenting).
118. Krantz was decided in 1998, while Jobe, Horina, and Klein were decided in 2005, 2008, and
2009, respectively.
119. Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939).
120. Id. at 162.
121. Horina v. Granite City, 538 F.3d 624, 635 (7th Cir. 2008).
122. See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text.
123. Horina, 538 F.3d at 639 n.3 (Manion, J., dissenting) (The ordinance “does not restrict
traditional leafleting, which, as the court notes, is the offering of written materials to individuals in
public places for their acceptance or rejection. . . . Rather, [the ordinance] prohibits the leaving of
handbills on automobiles; with an automobile, the driver is unknown and the receptacle is mobile and
lacks the ability to accept or reject the handbill.”).
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requiring vehicle owners to post a “No Solicitation” sign is a much
higher burden than that imposed in Schneider, which merely required a
passerby to say “no.” Even if a burden can be placed on the vehicle
owner to reject the leaflet, the current issue should fall outside the
specific holding of Schneider—that “the purpose to keep the streets
clean and of good appearance is insufficient to justify an ordinance
which prohibits a person rightfully on a public street from handing
literature to one willing to receive it.” 124
Additionally, the Schneider Court emphasized that “the streets are
natural and proper places for the dissemination of information and
opinion . . . .” 125 Parked vehicles are on the streets, but are in no way
“natural” places to convey ideas. Though police officers typically use a
windshield to issue parking tickets, this comparison begs a different
analysis because an improperly parked vehicle has broken the law.
Additionally, as demonstrated by the recent increase in windshield
leafleting litigation, windshield leafleting has become increasingly
common. 126 Merely because a practice has increased in volume,
however, in no way speaks to its legality, or more specifically,
establishes it as “natural and proper . . . for the dissemination of
information and opinion.” 127
Thus while Schneider established the right to leaflet, windshield
leafleting does not necessarily fall under the right recognized in
Schneider. The current issue neither involves direct distribution to
people nor are vehicles “natural” receptacles for literature.
2. The Appropriate Burden to Place on the Recipient
Because the principle from Schneider—that a general anti-littering or
trespass ordinance could address the problem—does not apply, the issue
becomes the appropriate burden to place on the vehicle owner. In
Bolger, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he First Amendment ‘does not
permit the government to prohibit speech as intrusive unless the
“captive” audience cannot avoid objectionable speech.’” 128 The Court
124. Schneider, 308 U.S. at 162 (emphasis added).
125. Id. at 163 (emphasis added).
126. The Eight Circuit first addressed windshield leafleting in 1998. Krantz v. City of Fort Smith,
160 F.3d 1214 (8th Cir. 1998). After a seven year lull, the Sixth Circuit ruled on the issue in 2005, with
the Seventh and Ninth Circuits doing so in 2008 and 2009, respectively. Jobe v. City of Catlettsburg,
409 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 2005); Horina, 538 F.3d at 624; Klein v. City of San Clemente, 584 F.3d 1196
(9th Cir. 2009). Thus, all of the litigation on windshield leafleting has taken place in the past twelve
years, with all but one case decided in the past five years.
127. Schneider, 308 U.S. at 163.
128. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 72 (1983) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v.
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found that a mail recipient is not a captive audience and placed the
burden on the recipient to opt out of unsolicited mailings. 129 In addition,
in Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton,
the Court placed the burden on the homeowner to post a “No
Solicitation” sign to reject door-to-door leaflet distributors. 130
The Eighth Circuit in Klein similarly determined that a vehicle owner
is not a captive audience and placed the burden on the vehicle owner to
place a “No Solicitation” sign on the dashboard. 131 However, as the
Sixth Circuit in Jobe more persuasively noted, placing the burden on a
vehicle owner to post a sign is an “unorthodox burden.” 132 The
difference lies in the nature of a door and a mailbox as modes of
communication; both methods are express invitations to reach a
homeowner, or at the very least are traditional methods of reaching a
homeowner. For example, a sidewalk typically leads to a door, where
ringing a doorbell can summon a homeowner, and thus invites visitors.
Similarly, a mailbox, by its very nature, is an invitation to send
information. In contrast, a vehicle in no way invites a speaker to place a
leaflet under its windshield wiper. While a mailbox exists to receive
information, a vehicle exists to provide transportation. 133
Putting the burden on a vehicle owner to post a sign on the dashboard
is both absurd and without merit. It is reasonable to assume that very
few vehicle owners, even if adamantly opposed to windshield leafleting,
will place an unsightly sign on their dashboard. Thus, the concept of a
“No Solicitation” sign is only theoretically sufficient, and a reasonable
vehicle owner is without recourse.
As previously mentioned, windshield leafleting is increasing in
popularity. Each vehicle owner is likely aware of the risk that someone
will place a leaflet on their windshield. Nevertheless, mere awareness is
not an invitation. To illustrate, albeit in a more dramatic scenario, a
homeowner may move into a crime-ridden area aware of the risk that an
intruder may break into their home, but such awareness does not create
Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 542 (1980)).
129. Id.
130. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 168 (2002)
(citing Schaumburg v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 639 (1980) (“[T]he provision permitting
homeowners to bar solicitors from their property by posting [no solicitation] signs . . . suggest[s] the
availability of less intrusive and more effective measures to protect privacy.”)).
131. See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text.
132. Jobe v. City of Catlettsburg, 409 F.3d 261, 272 (6th Cir. 2005) (Windshield leafleting
unjustly “put[s] the vehicle owner to the choice of accepting either a ridiculous requirement (removing
the windshield wipers) or an unorthodox burden (placing a ‘No Handbills, No Posters . . .’ sign on the
dashboard).”).
133. See id. (“Unlike a telephone, a mailbox, a computer or the well-trodden path to the front
door, the windshield wiper does not exist, formally or informally, to encourage communication.”).
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an invitation to break and enter.
In conclusion, Schneider does not require a government to use antilittering and trespass laws in lieu of a windshield leafleting ban, and it is
inappropriate to place the burden on the vehicle owner to post a sign to
opt out of leaflet solicitations. The holding by the Sixth Circuit in Jobe
is more persuasive. The court in Jobe held that the ordinance was
narrowly tailored because it “targeted the precise problems—littering on
private automobiles and unauthorized use of private property—that it
wished to correct.” 134 In Metromedia, Inc., the Supreme Court used a
similar analysis, noting that “the most direct and perhaps the only
effective approach” is to prohibit billboards. 135 The Court emphasized
that, because the ordinance did not prohibit all billboards, the city went
“no further than necessary” and actually “stopped short of fully
accomplishing its ends.” 136 As in Metromedia, Inc., the most direct and
only effective approach to both prevent littering and protect private
property interests is to prohibit windshield leafleting, while allowing
other types of leafleting.
C. Ample Alternative Channels
A leafleting ordinance must leave the speaker with adequate
alternative methods of communication. 137 Each circuit addressed the
use of the mail, door-to-door leafleting, and person-to-person leafleting
as possible adequate alternatives to windshield leafleting. While the
Sixth Circuit in Jobe found all of the aforementioned alternatives
adequate, 138 the Seventh Circuit rejected them. 139 The Seventh Circuit
argued that the alternatives are time-consuming, burdensome, and do not
allow the speaker to reach those who park in a specific area of a city or
neighborhood. 140
The Ninth Circuit reasonably rejected using the mail as a suitable
alternative to windshield leafleting. In addition to the expense of
stamps, collecting the addresses of the target audience is overly tedious
and burdensome. Direct distribution to persons in the street and
leafleting at homes, however, are more than adequate alternatives.
There are two relevant contexts where speakers typically windshield

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 269.
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 508 (1981).
Id.
See id. at 516.
See supra notes 63–67 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 85–89 and accompanying test.
See supra notes 85–89 and accompanying text.
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leaflet: (1) along the streets of a neighborhood—where homes line the
streets—and (2) along the streets of an inner city—where homes do not
line the streets. First, in the neighborhood context, door-to-door
leafleting may actually be a superior method to windshield leafleting.
The Supreme Court has recognized that “the most effective way of
bringing [leaflets] to the notice of individuals is their distribution at the
homes of the people.” 141 Moving from door to door may take more time
than simply strolling down the street from vehicle to vehicle, but the
additional burden is insignificant. A distributor may elect to leave the
leaflet on the front porch because several state laws suggest that
speakers may securely fasten leaflets to a front porch. 142 Such a strategy
also allows speakers to reach homeowners that are not home. Thus, the
travel time, while requiring an additional walk up the sidewalk, is not a
viable basis for invalidating door-to-door leafleting as an adequate
alternative.
Second, in the city context, streets are lined with parked vehicles, but
few homes are present. In such cases, while distribution to homeowners
may not reach the desired audience, direct distribution to persons in the
streets should suffice. Person-to-person distribution may require the
expenditure of a great deal of time if the area is not frequently trafficked.
However, it is reasonable to ask a distributor of leaflets to travel a short
distance to find a more advantageous location.
In Taxpayers for Vincent, the Supreme Court upheld a ban on signs
on utility poles because the speaker could still “distribute literature in
the same place where the posting of signs on public property is
prohibited.” 143 The same situation presents itself with regard to
windshield leafleting. Speakers may not windshield leaflet, but they
may distribute at that exact location, whether it be to persons walking on
the adjacent sidewalk or homes that line the street. Moreover,
alternatives do not have to be equivalent or superior to windshield
leaflets, but rather need only be “adequate.” 144 Further, the superiority
of a method “has practical boundaries.” 145 As discussed, within their

141. Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939).
142. See Van Nuys Publ’g Co., Inc. v. City of Thousand Oaks, 489 P.2d 809, 817 (Cal. 1971)
(striking down an ordinance that prohibited fastening leaflets on doorsteps or porches); Statesboro
Publ’g Co. v. City of Sylvania, 516 S.E.2d 296, 299 (Ga. 1999) (striking down an ordinance that
prohibited the distribution of leaflets on porches).
143. Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 792 (1984) (footnote
omitted).
144. Horina v. Granite City, 538 F.3d 624, 635 (7th Cir. 2008) (“An adequate alternative does not
have to be the speaker’s first or best choice . . . .”) (citations omitted).
145. Jobe v. City of Catlettsburg, 409 F.3d 261, 272 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Taxpayers for
Vincent, 466 U.S. at 812 n.30). See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88–89 (1949) (“That more people
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given contexts, both visiting homes in neighborhoods and direct
distribution to passersby in the city are more than adequate alternatives
to windshield leafleting.
V. CONCLUSION
While the First Amendment carries significant force, the law shifts in
favor of allowing bans on windshield leafleting. Local governments
have the power to maintain an esthetically pleasing landscape and to
protect the property of its citizens. Local governments should not have
to proffer independent evidence in support of these interests, as common
sense provides adequate justification in this context. However, to play it
safe, a legislature should establish independent supporting evidence
regardless of whether common sense is sufficient. Proving a significant
government interest is the second prong in the time, place, and manner
analysis, and a critical judiciary should not be provided an opportunity
to easily dismiss the claim.
Additionally, bans on windshield leaflets are narrowly tailored
because Schneider does not require local governments to resort to
general trespass and anti-littering laws, and it is inappropriate to place
the burden on vehicle owners to post a “No Solicitation” sign. Lastly,
the speaker has ample alternative channels for communication. Whether
in a neighborhood or in the city, the speaker may directly distribute to
individual homes or to passersby.
Sister circuits should heed the Sixth Circuit’s lead and uphold bans on
windshield leafleting. Although recent jurisprudence is trending in the
opposite direction, eight circuits, and most importantly, the Supreme
Court, have yet to rule on the issue. If the recent trend does not reverse,
vehicle owners will be subject to the needling annoyance and invasion
of personal property that windshield leafleting entails, and local
governments will be powerless to protect the esthetics of the city and the
rights of its citizens in an efficient manner.

may be more easily and cheaply reached by sound trucks . . . is not enough to call forth constitutional
protection for what those charged with public welfare reasonably think is a nuisance when easy means
of publicity are open.”).
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